ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
More commonly known as the Basic Telecommunication Agreement or GATS 1 Fourth Protocol, 2 this agreement is the product of efforts by members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to introduce global competition in basic telecommunications services. Three years later, this paper reviews the extent to which South Africa as a signatory since February 1998, has complied with that undertaking. It is suggested that while SA may not have reached full compliance, the tension produced by competing domestic policy goals on the one hand, and international trade aspirations on the other, accounts for this. I will argue however, that it is not necessary to resolve this tension as neither the domestic or international policy frameworks on their own will produce the goals and ideals espoused by GATS or domestic government's liberalization policies. 3 Rather, it is asserted that in the nexus of domestic development and international trade lies a useful mechanism of checks and balances. If carefully crafted and astutely applied this can facilitate broader sovereign domestic policy whilst honouring commitments to the multilateral trading order.
Part I of this paper sketches the main tenets of the GATS and its related instruments relevant to telecommunications. A brief outline of telecommunications reform in SA relevant to an understanding of the implications for international trade in also presented. Part II will enumerate SA's commitments under the Fourth Protocol and the Schedule of Specific Commitments, (the Schedule) including the additional obligations undertaken by adoption of the Regulatory Reference Paper (RP). A comprehensive analysis of these undertakings will be provided in regard to the current status of each within SA. While progress has been made on all six principles in the RP, it is submitted that a weak regulatory agency, beset with adverse internal and external influences has had the most adverse impact on the pace of change. The competitive safeguard dispute that arose between the United States and SA in respect of Telkom SA Ltd and AT&T Global Networks is instructive and will be reviewed.
In Part III, the "global-local" matrix is explored practically with reference to the conflicting domestic goals contained in the objectives of the 1996 South African Telecommunications Act. 4 The perceived limitations to the Fourth Protocol and the RP in particular are also examined. It is argued that acknowledging the distinctive nature of trade in services contributes to an understanding of the tensions that emerge. This in turn necessitates flexibility for the domestic application of global trade ideals in order to cater for divergent social and economic priorities. 5 It is however conceded that that while the effect of the tension between global and local policies can be beneficial, similar tensions produced by conflicting national 3 Including competition, attracting foreign investment or increasing network rollout. 4 The Telecommunications Act, 1996. 5 On the broader sovereignty debate, see generally John O. McGinnis, 'The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism', 1 Chi J Intl Law 2 at 381 (2000) and Kal Raustiala, "Sovereignty and Multilateralism" 1 Chi J Intl Law 2 at 401 (2000) . goals on the domestic level is of less value. To the extent that this tension affects global participation in the SA telecommunications market, its speedy resolution should be a priority.
II. OVERVIEW
Enormous technological developments and regulatory reforms over the last decade have supported a paradigm shift that has placed trade in services firmly within the WTO agenda. 
A. GATS and the Annex on Telecommunications 8
The GATS covers all services 9 and defines them by reference to the four modes of supply characteristic of service industries: cross border, consumption abroad, commercial presence in the consuming country and the presence of natural persons. Distinguishing these modes is crucial to recognizing that different forms of trade carry distinct domestic implications and create specific regulatory concerns across borders. These issues have shaped both the principles and rules embodied in the GATS, as well as the specific commitments that WTO members have undertaken in their Schedules. . 7 Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles used for consideration as additional commitments in offers on basic telecommunications, WTO Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (24 April 1996). See http://www.wto.org/wto/press/refpap-e.htm. (last modified: 25 April 1997). 8 Annex on Telecommunications, April 1994, App. To GATS, at http://wto.org/services/12-tel.htm (last modified: 25 April 1997). The current membership of the WTO is 140, as of 30 November 2000, of which over 100 are developing countries or countries in transition. For an overview of the GATS and trade in services, see generally Trebilcock and Howse, above note 6 at 270ff. See also Michael. H. Ryan 'Trade in Telecommunications Services: A Guide to the GATS' (Coudert Brothers: London, 1997). 9 Except those that are "supplied in the exercise of governmental authority which are neither supplied on a commercial basis nor in competition with other service suppliers." GATS, Article I:1 and I:3. 10 GATS can be simplified into two major components: the framework agreement containing the general obligations and disciplines that apply to all WTO Members (Part II comprising Articles II -XV inclusive) and the specific GATS is modeled on the GATT and is similarly imbued with the canon of nondiscrimination through the principles of "most-favoured nation" (MFN) and National Treatment. 11 Respectively, this requires that a concession extended by one Member to any other must immediately and unconditionally be extended to all other Members, 12 and that foreign services and suppliers be treated no less favorably than domestic ones. 13 Access to foreign markets is supported by a specific commitment requiring all Members to refrain from imposing any quantitative restrictions, economic needs test, or local incorporation requirements on another Member unless such limitations have specifically been listed in that Member's Schedule. 14 A number of general obligations and disciplines in the GATS and the Annex are also important to telecommunications apart from and in addition to the Schedules. These include requirements that all laws affecting service provision be publicly available 15 and that domestic regulation be reasonable, objective, impartial and not more burdensome than necessary. 16 In suggesting a standard of proportionality in this regard, the GATS explicitly acknowledges that the pursuit of national interests will vary across borders and require different approaches, oftentimes discordant with the GATS ideals. Proportionality, or what constitutes "burdensome" regulation, allows an objective gauge to be used in assessing acceptable limits in this regard. 17 While telecommunications services in most countries remains either fully or state owned, Article VIII and IX prohibit an incumbent from generally abusing its monopoly position or engaging in any anti-competitive business practices, such as price collusion or vertical integration in service sectors where that incumbent competes with other non-exclusive service commitments that are identified in the individual WTO Member Schedules (Part III encompassing Articles XVI-XVII inclusive.) 11 Unlike the GATT, GATS allows for differential application of the two: MFN applies horizontally while National Treatment is undertaken as a specific commitment. 12 The 'unconditionality' principle can however, be narrowed through exemption, Article II:2. See also Ryan, above note 8, and Arlan Gates, 'Technological Change, Industry Concentration and Competition Policy in the Telecommunications Sector' 58 Univ. Toronto Faculty of L. R. 2 at 98 (2000) . 13 Article XVII:1. 14 Article XVI: 2 (a)-(f). General exceptions exist, including measures necessary to protect public morals and order, protect human and animal health or secure compliance with non-discriminatory laws and regulations; national security or to secure obligations under the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. The specific commitments, including national treatment, apply only to the scheduled or listed sectors and thus only bind members to the extent that they undertake commitments. 15 suppliers. In the SA context, the existence of Telkom's business unit, SAIX and its subsidiary Intekom, in the Internet industry, has raised questions regarding the extent to which their exclusivity is used to leverage advantage in the highly competitive Internet service provision (ISP) market.
18
These provisions will be considered in greater detail below, as they form the kernel of the threatened complaint to the WTO by the US Trade Representative against SA, on behalf of AT&T. They also warrant consideration because in the context of gradual liberalization, the grace period afforded to Telkom in which to rebalance tariffs towards costs, 19 coupled with the lack of public access to accounting records, renders the Article VIII and IX provisions of the GATS particularly difficult to monitor.
B. The Fourth Protocol and the Regulatory Reference Paper
At the close of the Uruguay Round in 1994, gains had only been made in the supply of valueadded services, with few countries willing to open their markets in basic telecom services to either domestic or foreign competition. Parties to the Protocol have committed over varying time frames, to dismantle the state monopoly provision of these services, open entry to foreign suppliers and adopt pro-competitive and independent regulation in the sector. Despite this commitment, monopoly legacies continue to present complexities for the introduction of competition where structural advantages for dominant players exist.
28
For this reason, the widespread adoption of the RP is arguably the most important lubricant to the mechanics of the GATS and the realization of its objectives in telecommunications trade liberalization.
Although ostensibly a guideline, the RP is in fact a substantive foundation on which to design a template for regulation. With non-discriminatory standards serving to pry markets open, the regulatory principles, woven with pro-competitive ideals, provide the means with which to keep them so. The Fourth Protocol thus recognizes that lifting formal barriers to entry is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to ensure substantive market access because of the tendency of former monopolies to dominate. Whilst the principles have been criticized as lacking in substance, I argue that they remain a solid foundation for standardizing regulatory design. This contention will be explored further below. However, to assess SA's compliance with its WTO 23 The Regulatory Paper was later adopted by all participating countries except Ecuador and Tunisia. 24 Bronckers and Larouche, above note 20 at 23. 25 Including the conditioning of market access on the availability of spectrum; the extent to which basic telecommunications commitments include transport of video and/or broadcast signals within their scope; the potential anti-competitive distortion of trade in international services and whether the application of accounting rates to services and service suppliers amounted to "measures" under GATS and were subject to MFN. The latter two issues particularly, remain contentious in the international telecommunications arena and will likely form an important part of negotiations in subsequent rounds. For detailed examination of these concerns, see Bronkers and Larouche, Ibid at 13. For an excellent presentation of accounting rates debate, see the full issue of 24:1 Telecommunications Policy 51 (2000) . 26 The agreement came into effect on 5 February 1998 and currently has 72 signatories. 27 Either on 1 January 1998 or on a phased-in basis. 28 Simply stated, this advantage arises from the fact that the former monopoly, as a dominant player, has an established network, customer base and political access to policy makers. These advantages, often result in the refusal to provide facilities and interconnection to new entrants; unfair cross-subsidization and predatory behaviour. An independent regulator is intended to restrain this tendency. commitments and understand the implications for domestic policy, it is necessary to briefly consider the context within which SA participated in the GATS negotiations.
C. Telecommunications Reform in South Africa
Telecommunications reform in South Africa needs to be located within the broader political transformation process that resulted in the demise of Apartheid and the transition to democracy.
29
In 1992, Telkom was incorporated, replacing the Department of Posts and Telecommunications (SAPT) as the vehicle through which all telecommunications services were provided.
30
The company was partially privatized in 1997 through the conclusion of a 30 per cent strategic equity partnership, valued at 1.26 billion USD.
31
This sale was driven by the need to attract the capital and management experience required to transform a debt-ridden monopoly, prepare it for competition and facilitate the goal of universal service. In exchange for the latter, Telkom was granted a five-year exclusive license on all basic voice services and the provision of facilities to all service providers. 32 Including public switched, national long distance and international services, local access services and public pay phone services. In the five-year period Telkom is required to rollout 2.6 million lines in total, 1.6 of these in priority areas and 120 000 new public pay phones. The so-called "Telkom License" contains three separate licenses in one Government Notice: Government Gazette 17984 GN R768 (PSTS); GN R769 (VANS) and GN R770 (Radio) of 7 May 1997. 33 Telkom will not apply for the extension, which was to be negotiated between itself and the Department of The Telecommunications Act also cemented, at least temporarily, the duopoly position of the two cellular operators -Vodacom and MTN -whose licenses were granted prior to its enactment.
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Other non-exclusive services recognized in the legislation are Private 34 Telecommunications Act, 1996. See also the Green and White Papers on Telecommunications Policy, preceding the Act, Government Gazette 16995 GN 291 of 13 March 1996. The latter is also available at http://docweb.pwv.gov.za/docs/policy/telewp.html. 35 These central policy goals are expanded upon in seventeen listed objects of the Act, s 2 (a)-(q). They include inter alia, universal service; fair competition; economic growth and development; the ownership and control of telecommunication services by persons from historically disadvantaged groups; the promotion of small, medium and micro-enterprises; and the empowerment and advancement of women in the telecommunications industry. Similar provisions exist in the Broadcasting Act, 1999 augmenting the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, 1993. 
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Manufacturing and equipment supply is fully deregulated and competitive, subject only to the condition that all equipment is type approved by the Authority. 42 Despite a vibrant and growing telecommunications sector, it needs to be noted that of the estimated nine million households in SA, only three million have telephones, with less than 20 per cent of that figure in black households. 43 In addition to joining worldwide trends in telecommunication liberalization, reform in the SA telecoms sector since 1996 has been driven by a need to redress this disparity and the racial legacies of the past that it reflects.
III. SOUTH AFRICA'S COMMITMENTS UNDER THE GATS
The GATS was signed by South Africa on 15 April 1994 and the country's offer on basic telecommunications became part of its Schedule of Specific Commitments when it entered into force on 5 February 1998. 44 The following provides a chronological outline of SA's commitments.
A. 1994
In signing the GATS, SA committed to open its market only in value-added or enhanced services. 45 At the horizontal level, SA made no market access undertakings and chose to remain 39 There are two nationwide state PTNs: Transtel (a division of the transport utility, Transnet) and Esi-Tel (a division of the electricity utlity, Eskom) and a number of competitive interim PTN licenses have also been granted under the Act. Two national wireless data communications licenses authorized to transmit uni or bi-directional data were also 'grandfathered' under the old regime, one of which provides the infrastructure for South Africa's first national lottery. 40 44 SA's first offer was made on 29 January 1997 (S/GBT/W/1/Add.9 (97-0335)); and then modified on 31 January 1997 (S/GBT/W/1/Add.9/Rev.1 (97-0406)) and finally re-submitted on 13 February 1997(S/GBT/W/1/Add.9/Rev.2 (97-0563)). 45 Including e-mail; voice mail; on-line information and data base retrieval; electronic data interchange; facsimile services, including store and forward, store and retrieve; code and protocol conversion and on-line information and/or data processing (including transaction processing unbound with regard to the presence of natural persons, except for the "entry and temporary stay", without an economic needs test, of certain foreign individuals in order to provide a service.
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A national treatment limitation was entered on the local borrowing by SA registered companies with a non-resident shareholding of 25 per cent or more.
At the specific level, SA listed a number of limitations, including the bypass of SA facilities for routing both domestic and international traffic, including callback and country direct dialing services. There was no formal policy in place with respect to VANS and Telkom remained the de facto regulator, authorizing all services, including service by international VANS providers, through agreements on an ad hoc and informal basis. 47 In line with the horizontal listing, SA also remained unbound with respect to the presence of natural persons.
B. 1997
SA's 1997 schedule of commitments on basic services 
Facilities-based and PSTN Services
In terms of its license, Telkom is authorized to provide PSTN services and facilities for a period of 25 years, 59 with an exclusive right to provision for the first five years. 58 Many of the proposed amendments have no direct bearing on the subject matter of this paper and for this reason, detailed discussion of the Bill will not be included here. 59 Telecommunications Act 1996, ss 36(1)(a), 36(7)(c) and 36(9)(a). 60 Section 36(1)(a) and 30(3)(a). 61 See above note 33. 62 The others are Eskom, Transnet and the Airports Company, all in varying stages of privatization. Telkom's assets exceed R27 billion, making it the country's third largest parastatal after Eskom and Transnet. 63 The IPO is valued at between R80-100 billion (9.2-11.6 USD) and is expected to be one of the largest ever on the JSE. 'Telkom IPO among the biggest' News24.co.za, 23 October 2000 at http://www.News24.coza. A further 3% stake in Telkom, estimated to be worth more than R600 million was recently awarded to Ucingo Investments, a black economic empowerment group. The SNO will receive a full service license and be able to compete with Telkom in international, national long distance, payphone, local access and value-added network services. Consistent to all three versions of the proposed policy, up to 30 per cent of equity will be set aside for black economic empowerment. Finally, the March and July 2001 proposals indicated that foreign shareholding in major licenses will be restricted to 49 per cent. However, in the August statement, all foreign ownership restrictions were lifted, although the Ministers did not exclude the possibility that such a restriction could still be specified in the invitation to apply for the license. In a recent joint Communications Portfolio and Labor Select Committee briefing, the Minister noted that flexibility was necessary given the industry's state of flux. Government had therefore not wanted to specify how much of the market foreign companies could own as changing this figure at a later stage would be difficult if it was entrenched in law. She also noted that the specifics could easily be dealt with in shareholders agreements, voting pools or licensing arrangements. Also at this briefing, the Minister of Communications defended accusations that the policy process has been a 'flip-flop', stating that versions previous to August 2001 were merely drafts and not the Policy Direction Sentech (Pty) Ltd, the state-owned signal distributor, will have its current license amended to enable it to compete only in international services. Originally the policy envisaged that Sentech could offer service direct to the public, but in what has been billed as a 'clarification' rather than a revision, the August statement anticipates that the parastatal will be issued with an international gateway license, but it will be a "carrier of carriers" and will not provide service direct to the public.
In spite of a number of administrative concerns regarding the legislative fiat with which these proposed license amendments will occur, the policy proposals in this area accord with SA's commitments under the Fourth Protocol. Notwithstanding these questions, it is doubtful however, whether any meaningful competition or material impact on price for consumers will eventuate, given this clear attempt to secure telecoms revenue for the government through the award of licenses with continued, and in some cases, substantial state shareholding. . 68 Subject to the proviso that the Authority would define the terms and conditions as well as the maximum limit for foreign investment. 69 Clause 2.6. Chapter II of the White Paper, above note 34. 70 Section 32A(1). 71 Presumably, the government may argue that they have complied with resale obligations by introducing a SNO and other competitive licenses. Further, that the commitment does not specify whether resale services are voice or data, and that technically data resale is permitted, implicit in the provisioning of VANS services. This contention would a potential GATS violation, the existing prohibition on VANS offering voice services and voice over IP (VoIP) remains in force. 72 This unfortunate policy decision is likely to have a negative impact on the universal service imperative and remains a lost opportunity to introduce competition and lower costs. 
Mobile Cellular Services
Under the Fourth Protocol, SA committed to licensing one further cellular operator within two years, and the completion of a feasibility study by 31 December 1998. This undertaking too, echoed provisions already contained in the Act. This award be difficult to make, given that Telkom claims such resale is illegal under their exclusivity. I argue that in the absence of a definition to limit resale to data, the term must be interpreted in its common industry usage, that is, the sale to end consumers, of bulk discounted voice minutes purchased by resellers from network operators. Finally, it is apposite to note that this commitment was scheduled as an additional one, making it a positive undertaking. 72 Telecommunications Act 1996, s 40(2). 73 Given Telkom's most recent tariff hike in excess of 16% for local calls, one has to seriously question the wisdom of this choice. Despite the argument that this increase may be merely part of the rebalancing which must precede competition, it has been characterized by ICASA as having an adverse effect on consumers and "potentially having a negative impact on access to telephony. 76 The feasibility study, an invitation to apply and consequent application hearings, with bids received from international and local consortia were held within the specified time frame. Bids were received from 9 companies including AfricaSpeaks, Nextcom Cellular and Telia Telenor. Substantive delay in the process began with the announcement of Cell-C as the preferred winner in July 2000, triggering a spate of court proceedings on the basis of the concerns set out above. Losing bidder NextCom fired the first salvo in applying for an urgent interdict to prevent the Minister from confirming Cell C as winner. On the basis of an affidavit by the outgoing SATRA Chairman that alleged government interference in Council deliberations, the court granted the injunction, pending judicial review of the bidding process. Other grounds for the order include SATRA's alleged failure to consider independent assessments of the bids. In September 2000, the Minister sought leave to appeal in the Pretoria High Court on the basis that she was drawn into the licensing process to ensure that SATRA adjudicated in a fair and transparent manner. This, she claims was misinterpreted by rival bidders and the court as executive interference. The Minister also threatened to take the matter to the Constitutional Court for a decision as to whether the High Court in fact had the power to prevent her awarding the license before she had officially named the winner. Nextcom later withdrew only that part of the interdict preventing the Minister from announcing the winner, amidst speculation that a deal between Cell C and Nextcom had been struck. This has aptly served to reflect the difficulties created by having this role split between an executive arm of government and an independent agency.
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These licensing provisions and the implications for independence were questioned by international advisors hired to assist with the merger of the two authorities. It was suggested in this regard that SA amend its Act to effect compliance with its WTO undertakings.
84
As new and arguably more intricate roles for the Minister and the regulator in license decisions and awards 77 Ivor Powell, 'Satra split over Cell C' Mail and Guardian, 31 March 2000. 78 It was alleged that SATRA ignored a BDO Spencer Steward analysis report that did not recommend Cell C due to an inadequate business plan. SATRA mandated a consulting firm, Grant Thornton Kessel Feinstein (GKTF) to audit the decision, however controversy erupted when GTKF later disclosed previous contact with a bidder. The Communications Minister threatened to sue GTKF and the losing bidder, Telia-Telenor threatened to sue SATRA and government for the way in which the process had been handled. 80 It has also been financially disastrous for applicants, with Cell C alone having spent more than R2 million in legal fees. Other costs are to investor confidence, job creation, black economic empowerment, real price and service competition to existing operators and more than R4 billion in peak investment, of which half would have been foreign direct investment. Marina Bidoli, 'Debacle puts the frighteners into telecoms investors' Financial Mail, 6 October 2000. Structurally, the RP is divided into six sections. The first two apply to regulation of "major suppliers", 90 while the remaining four deal with general regulatory issues.
Competitive Safeguards
The RP requires "appropriate measures" to prevent major suppliers from engaging in or perpetuating anti-competitive practices, Telkom, which started in 1996, contained allegations of two of these three practices.
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Bronckers and Larouche suggest that an appropriate accounting system, with regular reporting and disclosure requirements, is the only effective mechanism with which to monitor these practices.
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A continued problem in this regard for SA ISPs in terms of their claim is the fact that the obligation on Telkom to prepare regulatory accounting does not take effect until the end of 90 A "major supplier" is one defined as one that can materially affect the terms of participation (price and supply) in the relevant market for basic telecoms services as a result of its position in the market, or its control over "essential facilities," (facilities of a public telecoms transport network or service that are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers, and cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to provide a service). 91 For an excellent assessment of competition in telecommunications and international trade in light of convergence, see Arlan Gates, above note 12 at 83. See also Marcus Fredebeul-Krein and Andreas Freytag, 'The case for a more binding WTO Agreement on regulatory principles in telecommunications markets' 23 Telecommunications Policy at 628 (1999) . 92 Not all cross-subsidization is anti-competitive, but it can easily become so in monopoly dominated markets when the operations from the profit making area are used to undercut competitors prices in non-exclusive service sectors. See Bronckers and Larouche, above note 20 at 27. 93 For example, information obtained thorough interconnection negotiations or where the major supplier requires full technical and other information to be lodged for a service order. 94 The Fourth Protocol had not yet been signed and the market had not reached the same level of maturity with the presence of foreign providers as it has now. 95 In the initial complaint to the then Competitions Board who had jurisdiction prior to the formation of SATRA, the ISPA alleged that Telkom was providing SAIX with certain advantages that were anti-competitive. For example, the unfair cross-subsidization between voice and Internet services, fuelled by the fact that SAIX could offer dial-up services at a substantially lower rate than the private ISPs; free co-location for SAIX in Telkom exchanges and rapid responses to line applications for SAIX on behalf of clients, for which ISPA members were often subject to long delays. Finally, that SAIX was engaging in predatory pricing and piracy of ISPA's customer base as information about the prospective client, including contact details, had to be submitted to Telkom on application for a leased line. For a detailed account of the ISPA claims to the Competition Board, see http://www.ispa.org.za/submission.html, and for a more detailed history of the relationship between Telkom and the independent ISPs, see D. Kotlowitz, 'Telkom, South Africa's Internet Anschluss: A Cautionary Tale" (1998) [Unpublished, archived at the University of Toronto] (On file with the author). 96 Bronckers and Larouche, above note 20. year five of the monopoly. 97 In the interim, Telkom is authorized to cross-subsidize within its basic basket of services. 98 Without an accounting requirement in place, it remains impossible to determine whether these revenue flows seep out into other areas of non-exclusive provision, such as Internet services and VANS.
Nonetheless, many commentators have criticized the RP provision as "toothless", most notably for the failure to specify a mechanism with which to address such practices, leaving members to determine their own, non-standardized measures. 99 This, it has been argued, has two adverse implications: the first, arguably less plausible one is that the vague definition of a 'major supplier' can be read to include foreign operators who are major suppliers in their own home country and measures can thus be directed at them, impeding market entry. The second suggests that the lack of safeguard rules for governments when adopting the regulatory framework, might lead to a failure in implementing effective action for preventing anti competitive measures by domestic suppliers with market power.
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There are however important policy reasons why Telkom is not subject to regulatory accounting at this point and to the extent that this is in fulfillment of an important domestic policy goal -the attainment of universal service -it is arguable that the WTO has no place in imposing strictures. While there have been some questions raised about Telkom's separation of revenue between competitive and exclusive service sectors, there is no glaring evidence suggesting that it has indeed violated these provisions. 97 Clause 8.1 of the Telkom PSTS license. This is to be established in accordance with the Chart of Accounts and the Cost Allocation Manual (COA/CAM). 98 In terms of clause 9.7 read with 3.1 of the Telkom PSTS License, tariffs need only be rebalanced at the end of the exclusivity period. For consideration of tariff rebalancing in the SADC region, see Southern Africa Telecommunications Restructuring Program, "Study Report: Telecommunications Tariff Rebalancing", A SATCC Telecommunications Sector Development Program, funded by USAID, 12 November 1998. As the report aptly points out, tariff rebalancing towards cost is crucial in gradually liberalizing markets as experience shows that international and long distance calls will be the first area targeted by new suppliers for their profit margin. Where tariffs are cost-based, competition will be distorted and the overall objectives for telecommunications development may be undermined or defeated, at 18. 99 Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag, above note 91, and Sherman, above note 88. But for a defense of this principle, see Chantal Blouin, 'The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications: a reevaluation' 24 Telecommunications Policy 135 at 139-40 (2000) . 100 Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag, Ibid, at 628-9.
Interconnection
Interconnection principles arguably constitute the core of the RP as competition is totally precluded in the absence of an effective policy in this regard. 101 Safeguards ensuring interconnection on reasonable terms and within a reasonable time are crucial to allow new market entrants access to the network of an established or monopoly provider. 102 Efficient interconnection requires certain common elements, enumerated in the RP, reflecting general principles adopted domestically by many liberalized countries.
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There are also some shortcomings to the principles as articulated in the RP, such as the failure to specify a costing basis, the degree to which networks have to be unbundled and whether a regulator can enforce an interconnection agreement. The RP does, however, suggest some baseline guidance. The Act requires the Authority to prescribe guidelines for the industry relating to the "form and content" of interconnection agreements and to determine fees, service levels and time frames. 109 It is of course arguable that the provisions of section 43 and 44 of the Telecommunications Act contain sufficient authority for the regulator to act in the case of failure to supply facilities and refusal to interconnect where the objective criteria are satisfied, and that the Guidelines do not constitute the only authority to do so. Moreover, the public interest objective threaded through the Act coupled with a general enabling provision in section 5(1)(b) that authorize the regulator to perform any acts necessary for the performance of its functions, should provide additional grounds on which to intervene. However, SATRA repeatedly refused to act on a range of facilities leasing disputes in the industry until such time as the guidelines were in place.
were being invoked.
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It is also within this context that the USTR threatened to take SA to the WTO.
The WTO Dispute: US and SA

115
By virtue of its predecessor's operations, AT&T is a deemed VANS license holder under the Telecommunications Act.
116
In terms of the Act, all license holders are required to use Telkom infrastructure for the provision of their services, until the termination of the latter's monopoly.
In July 1999, Telkom began to request written confirmation from VANS providers that they were not using their facilities for the provision of any service in violation of Telkom's exclusivity.
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When Telkom denied further requests for facilities, the SA Association of VANS providers (SAVA), of which AT&T is a member, approached SATRA for assistance. In September, the SATRA Council declared Telkom's behavior to be anti-competitive, but stopped short of ordering them to meet outstanding service requests. The fact that the interconnection and facilities leasing guidelines had not yet been promulgated was a further impediment as SATRA claimed it was prevented from granting relief under the Act.
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SAVA petitioned the High Court which referred the matter back to SATRA for determination, claiming that it lacked the competence to decide on the technical nature of the dispute, and further that it could make no 114 In this context, an interim ruling on an interconnection dispute between Telkom and Wireless Business Solutions (Pty) Limited (WBS) was handed down by SATRA on 11 February 2000. This ruling, recently challenged in the High Court, imposed terms and conditions for an interconnection agreement between Telkom and WBS. Both parties provide telecommunication facilities to the newly licensed, national lottery operator, Uthingo. Telkom claimed that the Interconnection Guidelines used by SATRA to make the ruling were invalid as the Minister had withdrawn them; that improperly followed delegation procedures by SATRA rendered their decision null and void; and that the terms of the agreements imposed on them through this process were invalid. The court upheld Telkom's latter two claims, but dismissed the first one. Other matters formed part of this dispute, including a complaint by WBS in respect of alleged anti-competitive actions by Telkom with regard to pricing in respect of Swiftnet, a Telkom's subsidiary competing with WBS. Despite the importance of this case as the first interconnection dispute to be contested in a SA court, it is highly complex and more appropriately the subject of another paper entirely. 115 While the potential dispute between the USA and SA over Telkom's refusal to supply facilities, is largely a "competitive safeguards" dispute, the lack of clarity over the facilities leasing guidelines makes it suitable for consideration in this context. 116 Section 40 deems any person who was providing a VAN service in terms of agreements with Telkom under section 78(2)(a) of the Post Office Act, immediately prior to the commencement of the Telecommunications Act, to be the holder of a license to provide that service. AT&T's predecessor, Trafex (Pty) Ltd was trading under those conditions since 1985. 117 Jennigay Coetzer, 'VAN Service Providers Complain of pressure' World Reporter, 6 October 1999. 118 The relief sought was under s 44(7) of the Act which provides in relevant part that, "where the Authority is satisfied that Telkom is unwilling or unable to make suitable facilities available to that person within a reasonable period of time, the Authority may, instead of proposing terms and conditions… authorize that person to provide or obtain any necessary telecommunication facilities other than from Telkom on conditions determined by the Authority." See above discussion note 109. determination while SATRA was seized of the matter.
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This ruling caused both parties to question SATRA's competence once again: SAVA claimed that SATRA's inability to adjudicate was the reason why they sought High Court intervention in the first place, and Telkom claimed that SATRA's continued lack of response to its complaints regarding VANS providers since 1997, had forced Telkom to begin withholding facilities. 120 The fact that SATRA had made little progress on finalizing a VANS licensing framework was also a contributory factor as the industry lacked certainty regarding the status and ambit of services included under a VANS license.
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At this juncture AT&T, frustrated with lack of recourse at the domestic level, approached the USTR for assistance. Including SA in its annual section 1377 review of telecom trade barriers in other countries, the USTR set a June 2000 deadline for "co-operative resolution of the dispute" failing which they threatened to take action under the WTO's Dispute Settlement provisions. 122 The claim suggests that Telkom's refusal to provide facilities is contrary to SA's WTO obligations to provide market access and national treatment for VANS.
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It is further claimed that SA is obligated to prevent Telkom from abusing its monopoly position when competing in the supply of a service outside the scope of its monopoly rights. 124 Finally, that under the provisions of the Annex, SA is required to ensure that US VANS suppliers receive "access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions." 
Universal Service
Although GATS Members have committed to a common vision on liberalization in signing the Protocol, it is evident that within the divergent country Membership, non-economic policy objectives, often contrary to the GATS ideals, will be pursued. These cannot always be quantified in empirically measurable ways, and will mean different things to different countries at different times. The adoption of a universal service policy is usually one such goal. Depending on where the policy is instituted, (developing or developed country) and the level and origin of contribution to it (firms or subscribers) and the model chosen by government to effect it (monopoly or multiple providers) will inform the degree to which it is valued. Precisely because access to telecoms infrastructure among Members is so uneven, the 'value' of such a policy can 126 never be equally quantified across the spectrum of GATS signatories. To this end, GATS recognizes Members rights to regulate services in order to meet divergent national policy objectives. GATS however requires that any measures pursuant to these objectives be carried out in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner.
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For example, Canada's subsidization of local phone service to remote and high-cost areas, was cited by the USTR as anti-competitive for certain long-distance carriers.
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No recourse at the WTO was sought however, in light of the CRTC's recent (and arguably unrelated) efforts to reform the contribution program.
132
In SA, an overarching objective of the Act is the supply of telecommunications services to those who were deliberately excluded by Apartheid.
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The White Paper characterized affordable communications for all as "the core of its vision and is the goal of its policy." 134 This is articulated in the objectives of the Act, and in the establishment of a Universal Service Fund (USF) which will receive contributions from all licensees. 135 The basis and manner of the contribution and the dates for payment are to be determined by ICASA and prescribed by regulation.
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Although this has not yet been finalized, the mechanisms anticipated are thus far GATS compliant: any measures adopted will apply to all service suppliers under all licenses in a similar manner and under a prescribed formula. One cannot be sure that the CRTC was responding to WTO concerns in this process. For an overview of the implications of the GATS Fourth Protocol on Communication Policy in Canada, see Janisch, above note 17 at 65-86. 133 While the objectives of the Act are not placed in an hierarchy, it is arguable that redressing apartheid exclusions is the de facto overarching one. Telkom's exclusivity is predicated on the assumption that the state is best placed to deliver services to unserved areas, that would not otherwise be serviced by competitors in a free market, who would "cherry-pick" only the profitable aspects of that market. Most conflict in the industry stems from Telkom's obligations in this regard: Telkom claims it is merely defending its roll-out plan, and government's important national policy, and competitors suggest that Telkom uses this claim as disguised protectionism. See above note 35. 134 Clause 1.1. The current national teledensity figure per household is approximated at 42 per cent overall, defined as the percentage of people who have a phone, cellular or fixed, in the dwelling where they live. The overall national universal access indicator, defined as the percentage of people who have access to a telephone, stands at 80. See above note 43. 135 Sections 65-67. The USF will be used exclusively for the payment of subsidies to assist needy persons towards the costs of telecommunications services. See Government Gazette 18617, GN 92 of 1998. 136 See Government Gazette 18277, GN R1332 of 1997. While ICASA is currently in the process of finalizing this with respect to VANS providers, the new Ministerial Policy Directions have proposed that all telecommunications licensees, including VANS, shall contribute a percentage of turnover prescribed by regulation, but shall not exceed 0.5%. The current ICASA proposals for VANS requires 0.25%. See Government Gazette 21642, 11 October 2000.
The Universal Service provision in the RP however, is not without criticism:
commentators have identified the vague language used to articulate this principle, as a potential barrier to market entry. For example, failure to specify the maximum set of elements comprising universal services; the amount of subsidy and how to determine who should be a universal service provider, allegedly allows Members to design measures that might serve as a disguised form of protectionism for local firms.
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While the right of governments to determine domestic policy will be discussed below, I suggest that this criticism is lacking in foundation. It is precisely because the value of universal service across countries, with varying levels of development, is difficult to quantify, that this area of policy making must fall squarely within the domestic domain. The complexities inherent in designing an effective universal service policy are too context specific to be determined at a multilateral level. To do so, would seriously compromise the pursuit of these social and other non-economic objectives.
Public availability of licensing criteria
Like many other countries, SA requires that all telecommunications services be provided under a license issued in terms of the Act.
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As licensing mechanisms can also serve as barriers to market access, the RP requires that the criteria, terms and conditions for licensing, where applicable, must be publicly available and where an application is denied, reasons must be provided on request. This requirement is valuable both from an administrative fairness point of view and to create certainty for investors. This is even more important in a market such as SA's where the realization of a domestic policy goal, such as ownership by historically disadvantaged persons, will remain a fixed criteria for awarding at least major service licenses.
In SA, the only two service categories that are currently open to full competition, subject to licensing, are VANS and PTNs. It is in respect of both these categories that the transparency requirements of the RP are being frustrated through delays in the finalization of a licensing regime. 137 See Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag, at 631. See above note 91. 138 Section 32(1). Section 33 specifies the categories of licenses which may be granted and the services authorized by such licenses. These are: PSTS; national and international long distance; local access and public pay phone services (all currently only applicable to Telkom) and cellular; VANS; and PTN services which may be provided on a competitive basis, but subject to licensing requirements. and where a license is denied or granted subject to conditions, the written reasons therefor. 144 Textually, SA's licensing requirements certainly approximate the guideline principles of the RP. To date however, a licensing framework for VANS and PTNs is still not yet publicly available. While the process was completed by ICASA in the second quarter of 2001, the regulations await approval by the Minister in order to be gazetted as law. 145 In the absence of a framework however, interim VANS licenses have been automatically granted to domestic and foreign suppliers, under interim SATRA guidelines. 146 Thus, it is unlikely that the delays could be viewed as amounting to lack of compliance with the RP. There are however two important implications that flow from them: the first is that the uncertainty has largely contributed to the SAVA and other disputes presently under consideration. The second is that the lacuna has informed ICASA's current attempt to design a framework by addressing the nature of the VANS disputes that have emerged. Specifically, ICASA has proposed conditioning the granting of a license on the usage to which the facilities obtained under the VANS will be put.
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This cautious, but arguably excessive regulatory effort by ICASA may create a number of problems for future compliance with the GATS instruments.
One additional point however warrants brief attention: Bronckers and Larouche have cited as a weakness the fact that the RP makes no provision for the mutual recognition of licences, possibly requiring regional operators to obtain individual licences from each country in a region. They do note however that even in established regional blocs like the EU, such mutual recognition has proven elusive. 148 It is arguable that this is a strength rather than a weakness, certainly in offering a degree of support to national policy formulation under the GATS. The domestic policy imperatives vary from region to region and between countries within regions. To have mutual recognition in regard to licensing would deny members the right to impose criteria that serve their particular domestic policy goals, such as foreign ownership restrictions or requirements for ownership by members of historically disadvantaged groups. To the extent that GATS is intended to embody notions of fair treatment and non-discrimination, it is sufficient that these principles operate at a relatively high level. Indeed, to do otherwise would not level playing fields, but arguably tip them in favour of dominant international players with the most resources.
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147 Above note 145. 148 Above note 20 at 31. They note that the EU proposal on licensing, Common Position 7/97 has only mandated the simultaneous and co-ordinated issues of licenses in the Union. 149 In this regard, it is important to note a recent allegation made by the USTR that SA is violating Article XVI of the GATS in proposing that VANS licenses contain a 15 per cent minimum shareholding by historically disadvantaged persons. The proposal is contained in Government Gazette GG N 4041, 11 October 2000, No. 21642. USTR's argument suggests that the 15% per cent minimum requirement amounts to an unscheduled limitation on the participation of foreign capital in sectors which it has scheduled GATS market access commitments. Their complaint is that SA has scheduled commitments in the relevant sector, but has not listed any exceptions applicable to the measure in question. (Article XVI:2(f)). This claim is controversial and arguably inaccurate: at the time of scheduling the relevant sector, no formal policy on VANS existed and SA reserves the right to introduce such policy, which may in future introduce a limitation on shareholding. On the language employed by SA in the schedule, and the fact that Article XVI is sector specific, it is plausible that SA has in fact not made any substantive specific commitment. This argument is supported by the European Commission's "Info-Point" on World Trade in Services representation of country commitments. In their account of country commitments by sector, they indicate that SA made no commitment in the services that constitute those currently defined as VANS. Finally, while autonomous liberalization beyond that which SA specified may have occurred, this does not however, attract obligations under the GATS. The USTR also noted that the requirement is a disincentive to investment by foreign companies. This too is a contested claim. This matter has not as yet, been raised in a formal complaint and due to length constraints cannot be examined in any greater detail here.
Independent Regulators
It is clear from a consideration of the foregoing that an institutional, non-aligned arbiter is essential to the implementation and maintenance of a competitive market; to license, monitor and enforce obligations and conditions, and to create a forum for dispute resolution. The RP thus requires an independent regulatory body whose decisions and procedures will reflect this ideal.
The fact that the RP, however, is silent on the need for regulators to be separate from and not have to be accountable to government, as well as to major suppliers has been raised as a criticism of its content. 150 Melody points out that while 'independence' has a number of facets, it does not necessarily include the power to make policy, "but rather the power to implement policy without undue interference from politicians, or industry lobbyists.
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This accords with the approach to institutional design followed in SA. The issue of funding however remains a serious obstacle. As were its predecessors, ICASA is wholly dependent on Parliament for funding.
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Like its predecessors, ICASA has continued to cite the lack of financial resources as a serious impediment to effective regulation.
International consultants on the Merger noted that [the agency's] statutory financial ties to the Department of Communications "does little for independence". 163 In absolute terms however, one is forced to question the extent to which a regulatory agency can ever be truly independent whilst on a government allowance? This is of course an issue that affects the full range of independent regulatory agencies and is not limited to telecommunications. Arguably the problem is not that public money is used but rather the attendant powers that inhere in the allocation of these funds and the implications this has for policy implementation. 159 Some assert that SATRA was considered "too" independent for government; others suggest that the merger was timeous in order to deal with allegations of impropriety and to "renew a quality in leadership to give confidence to a rather shaken industry". The misfortunes of the third cellular process and the flurry of court cases in the VANS arena, have been edifying on a number of levels, but for the most part reflect the ease with which regulatory capture can occur, or be perceived to be occurring. 164 It is noted that the efficacy and survival of regulators depends on their success in earning legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the stakeholders. Without that legitimacy, independence as well as the ability to perform core functions is effectively threatened. 165 The extent to which the capture allegations against ICASA prove either true or false is relevant to SA's obligations under its WTO commitments, but lack of compliance must be located within the context of the agency's funding. 166 To safeguard independence, the RP could have contemplated the inclusion of a neutral funding mechanism, such as the revenue generated from the payment of license fees.
Allocation and use of scarce resources
The RP includes commitments to allocate and use frequencies, numbers and rights of way in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. This directive can be linked to "global commons" theory, namely that effective management and allocation is necessary in order to co-ordinate a range of services and users who share a common (and scarce) resource.
Inefficiencies in one jurisdiction can potentially spill over into others infringing on the overall effectiveness of the resource for all. 167 ICASA is the agency responsible for control and management of the radio frequency spectrum and is obligated to honour all international agreements and standards in that regard. 168 To this end, the Authority has undertaken a Band Re-planning Exercise, Phase I of which was 164 Arguably as a direct result of the third cellular licensing debacle, the Schedule to the Telecommunications Amendment Bill contains a revised and expanded list of grounds upon which a councilor may, at any time, be disqualified or removed from office. It is worth noting however that this amendment authorizes the Minister, rather than the President, as is the case in the current Act, to effect the disqualification. The Minister merely requires the approval of the President and the concurrence of the National Assembly and Portfolio Committee. 165 Rohan Samarajiva, 'Establishing the legitimacy of new Regulatory Agencies' 24 Telecommunications Policy at 183 (2000) . 166 It is worth noting that for the court review of the third cell process, ICASA had to approach Parliament to increase its budget in order to pay legal fees to defend its actions. 167 See Trebilcock and Howse, above note 6 at 422. 168 Telecommunications Act, s 28. Section 30 requires licensing for specified radio transmission and reception services. initiated under SATRA. 169 Similarly, in 1997 SATRA began a review of SA's numbering policy with a view to the development of a new numbering plan, which despite its completion over a year ago, is still awaiting promulgation. 
IV. CONFLICT AND IMPLEMENTATION
It becomes apparent through a review of SA's compliance with its GATS commitments that any apparent lag is attributable both to the specific conditions in SA and also to a number of general problems inherent in the RP. While a number of operational flaws have been highlighted, they can all be reduced to one common theme: the level of generality with which the Reference Paper is phrased. To the contrary, rather than view this as a shortcoming, this generality is essential to allow Members to pursue national development policies so crucial to their political legitimacy.
This facilitates the development of the tension alluded to throughout the preceding analysis and is addressed below.
A. Limitations of the Fourth Protocol
Whilst solutions may diverge, there is apparent consensus amongst critics of the Fourth Protocol and the RP as to its weaknesses.
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These include the vagueness of the competition and interconnection principles; the voluntary nature of the specific commitments; the ability to file extended exemptions; the potential to free ride; to erect disguised and sanctioned barriers through numbering, licensing and universal service policies; the failure to specify regulatory 169 The second South African Band Re-planning Exercise (SABRE 2), Government Gazette 21833, GN 4568 of 7 December 2000. SABRE 1 was completed in 1997. independence from government and the opportunity to phase in changes and thus protect monopolies, all of which may frustrate the GATS in achieving its goals. 173 Noam and Drake critique the nature, rather than the form of these commitments as "standstill" consisting of binding liberalizing measures that have already been adopted at the national or regional level. 174 Whilst this is true for many countries, the Schedule however, does at least create a fixed (and arguably stricter) timetable for their realization. Nonetheless, the sum total of the aggregated weaknesses is two-fold: a clear doubt as to the effectiveness of a general commitment to foster and promote competition in telecommunications, and secondly, that the principles on their own, without sufficient particularity, could have the adverse effect of promoting protectionism endorsed, albeit unwittingly, by the GATS regime.
It is difficult to deny purchase in this view. However, the point that these criticisms appear to gloss over is precisely the fact that the document is a guideline. It is explicitly due to the asymmetry inherent in the WTO treaties that a flexible guide is needed to manage and allow for these differences while establishing a minimum common standard. It is for this reason that the proponents of the view that the RP should be more specific are, I submit, wrong. To give effect to these ideals, like the provision of dial tone in remote rural areas of South Africa, requires flexibility and pliancy in policy formulation. It is also for this reason that the nature of 'independence' may vary in its degrees of separation from government, as long as it is at arm's length; 175 that the structure of universal service objectives and who is liable to effect them, should be decided at a national level and that the licensing criteria for the provision of service should be capable of local tailoring. As long as a minimum floor of agreed standards is place, which accord with principles of administrative fairness, domestic governments should have the leeway to craft policies that best give expression to broader macroeconomic and social goals. For these reasons, it must be accepted that the RP was included in the negotiations to provide just the necessary safeguards in domestic law, not to override or supplant it.
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Along these lines, other commentators are more sanguine. Blouin argues that the RP's role is merely one of an 'insurance policy' in that the commitment to keep a sector open and subject that undertaking to multilateral dispute settlement, provides investors with certainty and predictability that domestic liberalization alone cannot offer. 177 Whilst acknowledging that a horizontal approach to market openness may allow for a more coherent perspective on the relationship between trade, competition and regulatory policy, she concludes that the sectoral approach offers many more benefits. The most important of these is the recognition that including the specifics of competition policy and domestic regulation in multilateral trade agreements, would be viewed as an unacceptable encroachment on national sovereignty, which would in turn serve to undermine the very legitimacy of the international trade regime.
transactions…and, attaching access conditions to foreign suppliers services.
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The Annex also recognizes this tension within the developing country context and authorizes reasonable conditions to be placed on access to and use of those Members public telecommunications networks and services, "necessary to strengthen [their] domestic infrastructure and increase
[their] participation in international trade in telecommunications services." 181 The new guidelines for subsequent services negotiations unequivocally endorse these fundamental GATS principles. 182 In the SA context, analysis of this flexibility is apposite. On the one hand, macro economic policy commits the country to liberalization and privatization. This inevitably requires an environment attractive to foreign capital and investment. On the other hand, because of inequalities resulting from Apartheid, a "redress initiative" has been injected into almost all economic sectors. Telecommunications is no exception. The Act, dedicated to public interest regulation, lists a number of objects in this regard and requires their promotion.
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While it is uncommon for legislation to embody such extensive enunciation of aims and objectives, it is important to understand the enormous financial stakes at issue and the influence of the historical context of Apartheid from which this emerged. 184 with the fundamental underpinnings of the GATS -market access and national treatment.
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Universal service aims, as we have seen in the SA context, may serve to buttress a monopoly and contribute to sustaining a closed market.
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Ownership restrictions similarly limit foreign entry.
Yet, empowerment as a value must be a criterion used, alongside technical compliance and financial competence, to determine the basis upon which licenses should be awarded. This cannot be effected if the undiluted ideal of the GATS -open markets -were to be implemented without restraint. It is clear however, that this is indeed not the case and such domestic goals are thus not GATS incompatible: GATS explicitly provides for the expression of these ideals in order to create critical mass and support the political legitimacy of those signatories domestically.
In this light, for SA to have been denied the flexibility to prescribe the content of the regulatory principles it undertook, with due regard to transparency and competitive neutrality, would have completely undermined its domestic reform agenda as well as the expressed recognition of these ideals of the GATS, cited above. At the same time, the aim of competition and attracting investment cannot similarly be realized by application of domestic policy alone -a policy that explicitly endorses the dominance effects of a monopoly market. Thus, to not have the RP's principles with a sufficient degree of particularity to establish regulatory standards necessary for international competition, would have been equally defeatist of the GATS purpose.
What emerges from that tension is a useful mechanism to attempt to balance domestic objectives with international trade commitments. This is particularly useful in a context that requires sensitivity to systemic inequality and the foresight to prepare for international competition. Many may argue however, that this tool has not been successfully applied, particularly in light of the foregoing analysis. This does not however, detract from the argument that the tension itself can be an important facilitating tool for domestic development, in the SA instance for example, to check the 'cream skimming' effects of full deregulation in a developing market and at the same time gradually to open it to competition.
Less than satisfactory results in SA's case, I argue are attributable to weak regulatory design and implementation, but this is not a burden the regulator should bear alone: the legislature needs to loosen the purse strings and clothe the regulator with ability to carry out its functions. The executive and the regulator need to find acceptable ways to accommodate the blur between policy formulation and implementation, without creating interference in each other's domain. It is suggested, though, that the lessons emerging from the first three years typify those that occur in newly liberalizing sectors adjusting to the demands and complexities of reregulation. It is hoped that these will diminish over time as this adjustment is gradually achieved.
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V. CONCLUSION The last decade has seen more policy and legislative reform in international telecommunications than any other time in history. The GATS Fourth Protocol is a clear reflection of how extensive and far-reaching this "reformation era" in telecommunications is. I have argued, however, that this global framework, predicated on opening markets and preparedness for competition, presents substantial difficulties for countries whose development imperatives manifest a seeming conflict with this ideal. I have endeavoured to illustrate this dynamic by assessing the degree to which SA has complied with its GATS undertakings and have tried to explain any apparent lag in compliance by illustrating this tension at play.
To date, there are clearly areas where SA has ostensibly skirted non-compliance. There are also potential risks for non-compliance with other commitments in the future, but for these, it is too early in the liberalization process to make a definitive assessment. I have also argued that SA never undertook any commitments more onerous than those it already assumed through its process of telecoms reform from 1994 until the present, although I have argued that GATS imposes a more rigorous timetable for implementation of such reform. 188 The ITU has initiated a Regulator's Forum for existing regulators and policy-makers interested in establishing a regulatory body. The first Development Symposium for Regulators was held in Geneva from 20-22 November 2000, Further, I have endeavored to show that the dynamic produced by the tension between domestic policy and international trade objectives is a useful mechanism to effect reform on the domestic level. It is in this context that the tension is asserted to be a positive one, operating as an effective check and balance against the deleterious effects that either, left to their own devices, can create. However, from the above assessment of SA's GATS commitments, it is clear that greater political will and policy co-ordination will have to be displayed, to garner the benefits of this application. Under this line of argument, it is apparent that similar domestic tensions, evidenced by the range of disputes before ICASA and the courts, exacerbated by a weak regulatory agency, is less beneficial, and potentially damaging to the sector. It is imperative that SA "get the regulatory framework right" and re-establish the legitimacy of an independent authority, so crucial to successfully managing and maintaining momentum in the transition to competitive markets. 189 In terms of a comparative assessment of SA's compliance, the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism should be instructive when its next cycle occurs. Aimed at improved adherence to rules, disciplines and commitments made under multilateral trade agreements, this body assesses individual members trade policies and practices and how they have an impact on the trade regime. SA's review cycle is set to occur every four years and was last reviewed in 1998 as part of a grouped review of the Southern African Customs Unions (including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland). 
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With experience, many gaps in the instruments will be identified and will need to be addressed and in some cases, improved. Certainly, several more rounds of negotiations will be required. Secondly, whatever the perceived weaknesses of the GATS Fourth Protocol may be, because the agreement was negotiated as part of a multilateral treaty, offers and commitments are binding and practically irreversible. In this light, it reflects a minimum consensus on the goals to be pursued and the lowest common denominator below which a signatory cannot go.
Because of the critical importance of telecommunications as an essential infrastructure to the information economy, this consensus, embodied in a multilateral agreement, has an inherent and momentous value of its own. 
